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Having been established in the field of financial services, this paper is the fifth issue of 
the Vlerick Policy Paper Series to appear in the domain of healthcare policy. 
Chosen themes, scientific and technical data, expressed viewpoints and policy 
recommendations are under the full responsibility of the authors only. Only the authors 
are responsible for possible errors or omissions1. 
This paper is an essay on the highly-valued by society but felt-to-be excessively-priced 
nature of medicines.  
The author wishes to express its gratitude to Lode Lauwaert, professor in the philosophy 
of technology at the KU Leuven Institute of Philosophy for providing the inspiration in his 
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Technology, or better the socio-technical system should do good to society. But what is 
good? It depends on how people and their political ideologies see it. Which gives more 
credence to the conjecture that technology ethics should be studied at Science, 
Technology, and Society, STS level. So beyond the individual. This while it provides more 
wholistic insights, deeper understanding of potential ethical issues related to technology, 
which can lead to more robust solutions for what in essence are complex messy problems. 
In this essay I used a game-theoretic approach to confront the European welfare state- 
and the American individualistic free enterprise views to provide a synthetic picture on 
the role of technology to the good society. I felt it to provide me with an inspirational 
analytical philosophy perspective to further hypothesize change strategies on the political 
– business economic spectrum level. The latter having the force to transform firmly 
entrenched off-equilibrium or minimum performance equilibria into stag hunt positions. 









‘Should ethics of technology target primarily the responsibility and ethics of individual 
humans or rather evaluate the entire socio-technical system?’ This quote form 
Coeckelbergh’s (2018) recent paper (cited further as CKB) inspired me for this essay. In 
his text, CKB claims that philosophers of technology should use more the resources and 
principles of political philosophy to study technology’s contribution to the good life and 
the wider sociotechnical context, its culture and societal practice. 
The access a “good society” wants to the most recent life-saving cell & gene therapies, 
disruptively innovative but felt to be unaffordable while excessively i.e. unfairly priced, 
will be used to test the CKB-conjectured need to go beyond  the individual technical level 
into political philosophy when philosophizing about technology  
The moral issue at stake here is the long-standing concern for the pharmaceutical 
industry to charge ever higher prices ‘whatever the market will bear’, which is perceived 
to be leading to unreasonable and unethical profits to the point that Rawls’ distributive 
justice principle (1971) is at stake. Going back to Aristotle, Hume, and Mill this has to do 
with the fair distribution of society’s burdens and benefits (Spinello, 1992). Charging 
premium prices for advanced medicinal therapies, considered by many to be a common 
good leads to an inequitable distribution pattern between the innovating company and 
society, the latter represented by the State executing a health economic policy as part 
of its welfare economics program. 
Following, I intend to unpack the phenomenon of health technology ethics. This will 
be followed and concluded by a critical reflection of its impact on Western capitalist 
ideology-laden healthcare systems. 
 
2. The need for a societal ethical view of health 
technology 
 
To understand the social shaping of innovative life-saving pharmaceuticals there’s a need 
for a societal ethical view of health technology as opposed to the patient-personal view 
of restoration of personal capabilities as expressed by Nussbaum’s capabilities’ list 
articulated in Frontiers of Justice evocating ‘central requirements of a life with dignity’, 
and for which an ‘appropriate threshold level’ needs to be reached (Nussbaum, 2006: 
75). As an example, it is not the dilemma whether curing is enhancement or not that is 




Instead, taking a consequentialist society-level stance to life-saving but 
excessively priced medicinal technology is a necessity. This while saving life may be 
instrumentally good given both the intrinsic moral and extrinsic functional value created 
for now-cured patients. However, this does come at a cost society can afford lesser and 
lesser, bringing down part of its extrinsic value to our political ideology-laden health 
systems to the point of some of them feeling endangered in their existence.  
Now, although ‘technology has been a central theme in political thought for the 
past two hundred years’ (Winner, 1977), its potentially disruptive impact on health 
systems has been up to now often neglected. However, with present-day breakthrough 
medicine prices up to 2 million $ per patient (Carr & Bradshaw, 2016; Dreitlein, Towse, 
Watkins, & Paramore, 2018) time is right now to move from bioethics to biopolitics 
(Obasogie & Darnovsky, 2018) when studying the impact this life sciences-based 
advanced technology (Stremersch & Van Dyck, 2009) has on the good society. 
Taking this political philosophy stance, a socio-technical system perspective 
considers the good these life-saving therapies could bring in the global environment 
(Figert & Bell, 2014). However, I will emphasize the dominant markets of the West; the 
North-American and European institutional health systems. This while it is in these 
resource-rich societies that the epitome of global pharmaceuticalization 2  featuring 
disruptively innovative but societally unaffordable medicines comes most to the fore.  
Theorizing on technology and the good society, then, I follow Brey (2018) that it 
is imperative to avoid a deterministic or technological neutrality worldview. It is in the 
societal technology access orchestration a specific institutional context provides for, that 
life-saving technology generates social impact.  
Using Guala’s (2016) game-theoretic institutional perspective I will analyze the 
moral issue at stake at a North American – European connected health system level and 
indicate some potential challenges and resolution avenues. This way, I will provide more 
evidence for the CKB-conjectured need to inform philosophy of technology with methods 
drawn from analytical political philosophy that epitomize the need to be sensitive to 







2 Figert and Bell (2014) define pharmaceuticalization as ‘the process of understanding and/or treating social, 
behavioural, or bodily conditions with pharmaceuticals’. They further mention related to this phenomenon 
that ‘the majority of sociological scholarship has investigated pharmaceuticalization as a primarily Western 




3. Looking through an institutional game-theoretic 
lens 
 
High-priced medicines is an age-old ethical problem with no simple solutions. It is 
generally accepted in our Western economies that pharmaceutical companies, like all 
others, have the right to enjoy the fruits of capitalism and profit from their discoveries 
(Maitland, 2002). Early business ethicists argued that managers need to balance their 
legitimate drive for profit and return on investment ‘with an equal consideration of the 
crucial importance of distributive justice3’, aiming for ‘a realistic and reasonable level of 
profitability’ (Spinello, 1992).   
However, others stress the need to recognize that the justified intellectual 
property rights leading to monopoly profits for innovative therapies is not an absolute 
right. Especially so knowing that the life-saving or curing nature of the latest most 
innovative therapies gives them excessive non-instrumental moral value. Hence, industry 
pundits note that this should be balanced with the right to life, the right to adequate 
health care, the right to essential life-saving drugs and the obligation to aid those in 
need’ (De George, 2005). Furthermore, society’s duty is to maximize population health 
gains whilst maximizing budget allocative efficiency (Luyten & Denier, 2019). Now, it is 
argued that excessively priced medicines will lead to societies not being able to buy 
anymore, which in turn would then lead to pharmaceutical companies not generating 
breakthroughs anymore in areas of high unmet medical need. Given the sustainable care 
duty of the State to its citizens the latter is then seen by some as the lesser of two evils 
(De George, 2005).   
To resolve this dilemma of conflicting expectations, in recent years companies 
have responded with an exponentially increased interest in corporate social responsibility 
(CSR). CSR takes a morally-tainted stakeholder approach replacing the then prevalent 
legal-economic shareholder approach to conduct its business relationships (Haase & 
Raufflet, 2017). Now, some say CSR is not to be confused with morality (De George, 
2005), expressing their fear that company assurance to serve resource-poor societies 
through non-market strategies (Bach & Allen, 2010; Henisz & Zelner, 2012) does not 
plead them free of recognizing their ethical responsibility exorbitantly pricing their 
medicines in the most affluent, typically Western side of their businesses.  
Clearly, CSR should constitute responsible behavior of a company towards society. 
Only, this can be implemented following a variety of Western capitalist ideologies. Hence, 
in a neoliberal ideological frame, dominant in the US, it is referred to as shareholder 
value maximization  (Djelic & Etchanchu, 2015). This stands in contrast to the EU-
purported ‘balance the interests of stakeholders’ felt-to-be morally superior sustainability 
view (Bowie, 2013: 91), which follows Freeman’s instrumental stakeholder theory (1997, 
 




2001) stating that to make profits firms should manage their stakeholder –not only 
shareholder–  relations. 
Both ideologies purposed to accomplish population health have been 
institutionalized on both sides of the Western world. Institutions are ‘bundles of regulative 
rules that govern our interactions in sets of related games’ (Hindriks & Guala, 2015). 
Regulative rules in a healthcare set following a socio-political ideology are considered to 
be fair by its constituents, thus exhibiting normative power. Thus, I propose to study the 
impact of technology on the good society through an institutional game-theoretic lens. 
Using this normative language of rules-in-equilibrium theory (Guala, 2016: 70-
85), they are bundled as conditional strategies of coordination games in which equilibrium 
profiles fulfil functions that make constituents feel better off –related to medical utility or 
fairness– as if they would pursue out-of-equilibrium outcomes.  
Games’ outcomes for innovative pharmaceutical industry (I) and public/private 
payers (P) can be verified on the matrix representations of Figure 14. Institutional games 
can exhibit an ‘orchestrator’ (Guala, 2016; Hindriks & Guala, 2015) exhibiting a 
normative deontic power to have its constituents find an equilibrium in their transactions 
with each other. 
 
Figure 1: Institutional games compared 
 
In the collectivist welfare state ideology-inspired EU the orchestrator role is most 
typically taken up by a State health policy. At present, being more and more confronted 
with an affordability challenge both innovative industry and public payer are seen to 
mutually defect; driven by medicine prices felt to be exorbitant, public payers respond 
more and more by defecting behaviour. Example strategies include compulsory licensing, 
and compounding or off-label use for economic reasons –as opposed to the mutually-
accepted use for clinical reasons– of medicines in their legislations. This leads to 
 
4 Numbers in the game matrices should not be seen in absolute but conceptually in relation to each other. 
They represent respectively for Industry (I), a Business Return Index PI=PV/Co, which is present value of 
return (PV) divided by the investment cost (Co) needed. For the Payer side (P) it represents the Social Return 
on Investment (SRI) in the areas for R&D investment. Based on World Health Organization data this 





institutional games being trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma or minimum payoff stag hunt 
equilibrium represented in Fig. 1 by respectively the (D,D) or (H,H) pairs of strategies. 
While minimum payoff (1,1) is guaranteed whatever the other does, both players 
implement these strategies independently from each other. This is the prototypical 
equilibrium where pharmaceutical technology’s consumption in society is a failure. So 
how to make technology good to society? 
Fortunately, next to providing predictability in situations of uncertainty as depicted 
above, norms can also create new behaviour. More specifically, it would be beneficial for 
both public payer and innovative industry to move into collaboration and thus reach a 
stag hunt maximum payoff equilibrium (S,S). This can be made possible when unilateral 
off-equilibrium behaviour5 is discouraged and possibly collaborative behaviour is made 
more valuable for both parties6. However, collaborative strategy execution requires trust 
in each other. This means that collaboration will only be initiated and sustained in 
repetitive games given one of the parties consistently shows its willingness to collaborate. 
Answering this signal the other party will follow. Given the general present mistrust of 
public payers across the EU for the pharmaceutical industry, I feel the innovative industry 
has a duty to initiate this norm-setting. As an example, engaging with public policy 
makers in regulatory innovation emphasizing a ‘conditional dialogue’ among key 
healthcare system stakeholder has been successfully done in the field of cancer (Van 
Dyck, De Grève, Schots, Awada, & Geldof, 2016). This should be followed suit by other 
global pharmaceutical companies individually or collectively forming coalition strategies 
showing their institutional engagement (Doh, Lawton, & Rajwani, 2012; Dorobantu, Kaul, 
& Zelner, 2017). 
In contrast, in the US private payer-dominated institutional health game the State 
level would be the most incentivized to move the pharmaceutical industry out of its 
defecting prisoners dilemma into a stag hunt equilibrium. This can be done by giving 
more power to the public payer side hence making the present industry staying in its off-
equilibrium position less attractive. Doing so, Democrats politicians suggest here to 
‘create a Medicare for All, single payer, national health insurance program to provide 
everyone in the US with comprehensive health care coverage, free at the point of 
service7. It would allow Medicare (the largest US public payer) to negotiate with big 
pharmaceutical companies to lower prescription drug prices. At present, Medicare is by 
law not allowed to negotiate with industry.  
But there’s another more fundamental, cultural challenge to be resolved. 
Americans are technology optimists who don’t want to wait long for the latest 
innovations, almost “whatever the price”, the latter especially when dealing with life-
 
5 Meaning discouraging (C,D), (D,C), (S,H), and (H,S) strategies 
6 Discouraging behaviour means moving from (C,D)=(0,3) to (S,H)=(0,1) ˄ (D,C)=(3,0) to (H,S)=(1,0). 
Making collaborative behaviour more beneficial for both can be expressed as (C,C)=(2,2) → (S,S)=(2+δ, 
2+δ)  




saving medicines (Scannell, 2015). So, while collectivist-inspired European public payer 
systems would typically aim for equitable access to medical technology, individual rights-
inspired US private health insurers want to provide their customers with wide access to 
medicines, even at a premium insurance price only the most affluent can afford. Too bad 
for the majority of the population. Therefore, a second move required to get the 
institutional system in stag hunt mode should necessarily convince the health insurers 
that they can significantly enhance their market by broadening the accessible patient 
pool from wealthy hypochondriacs towards the elderly and poor segments of society. This 
would raise the value of the stag hunt equilibrium to (S+δ, S+δ) and facilitate the 
departure from the present entrenched US health system prisoners dilemma equilibrium.  
So, the institutional solution is to get the two dominant connected Western health 
games into stag hunt positions. As mentioned above, on the European side this implies 
innovative industry-initiated efforts enhancing trust between the innovative 
pharmaceutical industry and the State. On the US side, this would necessitate State-
initiated political change now giving negotiating power to public payers and incentivizing 
private health insurers to change their business model. This will only happen if carried 
by the American people’s cultural preferences related to health care. Hence, resolving 
the challenge of expensive medicines will be a hard sell in the hands of politicians in need 
of convincing spoiled over-paying US health customers to have less choice and wait 
longer for innovation. Not to speak of a majority feeling across all social classes that its 
individual freedom rights are infringed when having to sign up for a compulsory general 
health plan (Scannell, 2015).   
It should be sufficiently clear by now that feelings of frustration and unfairness 
related to excessive pharmaceutical pricing is driven by a global business economic 
phenomenon, which in turn is driven by cultural differences hardwired in difficult-to-
change capitalist ideology-laden health systems. The US pharmaceutical R&D and market 
is by far the largest in the world and global price-maker. The countries of Europe, fearing 
loss of sovereignty to the EU level, are free to negotiate only at individual State level, 
which makes them, at best, low-powered price-takers. Only capable of individually down-
negotiating, within very strict limits, the prices set in the US. 
Amplified by the growing anxiety that the latest advanced therapies coming at 
mind-blowing prices of 2 million per patient will endanger the continued existence of our 
European welfare state, it is safe to say that the extent to which health technology is 









Technology, or better the socio-technical system should do good to society. But what is 
good? As exposed above, it depends on how people and their political ideologies see it. 
Which gives more credence to the initial, also, CKB-carried conjecture that technology 
ethics should be studied at Science, Technology, and Society, STS level. So beyond the 
individual. This while it provides more wholistic insights, deeper understanding of 
potential ethical issues related to technology, which can lead to more robust solutions for 
what in essence are complex messy problems. 
Applying an STS perspective to the advanced but excessively-priced medicines 
case allowed us to disentangle this messy complexity. This by making use of game-
theoretic approaches applied at institutional level. For sure, this illustrative case warrants 
further study, probably in the field of cultural anthropology to better understand the 
culture variance driving people’s views of the value and role of technology in a good 
society.  
Finally, this essay used a game-theoretic approach to confront the European 
welfare state- and the American individualistic free enterprise views to provide a 
synthetic picture on the role of technology to the good society. I hope it has sufficiently 
shown to be a powerful method to further hypothesize change strategies on the political 
– business economic spectrum level having the force to transform firmly entrenched off-
equilibrium or minimum performance equilibria into stag hunt positions. This in the 
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